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The state and violence: perspectives
from ancient India
Upinder Singh
1 The  instant  we  recognise  violence  as  an  important  and  intimate  part  of  human
experience, the way we look at history, the questions we ask, the answers we seek, all
change dramatically. In my recent book on the subject, I examined political violence in
ancient  India  between c.  600  BCE and 600  CE,  with  special  reference  to  the  state’s
punitive role, war, and interactions with the forest. I pointed out that all traditions,
including the religions of nonviolence, Jainism and Buddhism, accepted that a certain
amount of violence was necessary for kings.  I  argued for a connection between the
growth and systemisation of state violence and the increasingly sophisticated attempts
to mask, invisibilise, justify and aestheticise this violence in various ways. At the same
time, I pointed out that ancient Indian political discourse consistently distinguished
legitimate force from illegitimate force and kept open a window for interrogating the
state’s violence. I also argued that what is distinctive about ancient India is not that
Indians were especially  nonviolent  people  but  that  ancient  Indian political  thought
displays  a  unique,  intense  and  prolonged  engagement  with  the  tension  between
violence and nonviolence. In this paper, I would like to take some of the arguments
further.
2 It is difficult to draw a dividing line between the threat or use of coercive power or
force  that  is  necessary,  and that  which is  illegitimate  or  disproportionate  –that  is,
violence. Assessments will differ, depending on perspective. So the words “force” and
“violence” are fluid categories, difficult to define in absolute terms.
3 Over the centuries, political theorists have justified the state’s coercive, punitive and
military powers, and have argued that it is these powers that stand between order and
anarchy. In terms of their perspective, almost all the sources available for the history of
political ideas and practice in ancient India are statist and centrist. The theories of the
origins  of  kingship  emphasise  the  king’s  responsibilities  towards  his  people  and
describe taxes as his wages for the protection of his subjects, preservation of the social
order, and prevention of crime and violence. The king’s just punishment prevents a
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descent into “the law of the fish” (matsya-nyaya), an anarchy where the mighty devour
the weak. My paper has three parts:  the justification of the use of force in ancient
Indian theories of the origins of kingship; the assertion of the state’s right to punish,
torture and kill;  the anxieties of  political  theorists about the problematic nature of
kingship and violence against the state.1 In my conclusion I raise some general issues,
including the relationship between political theory and practice and the possibility of a
global comparative history of political violence.
 
I. Theories of the birth of kingship
4 Let us look first at the implications of three accounts of the origins of kingship –two
from the Mahabharata, one from the Buddhist Tipitaka.
5 The Shanti Parva of the Mahabharata (the great Sanskrit epic composed between c. 400
BCE and 400 CE) offers two accounts of the origins of kingship. The first account takes
us back to an age of perfection when kingship and punishment did not exist because
they were not required.2 However, men fell prey to error, confusion and greed and they
approached the gods Brahma and Vishnu to intervene. Vishnu produced a mind-born
son Virajas, who was followed by his son and grandson Kirtiman and Kardama. But
these three chosen men did not want to rule; they were inclined towards renunciation.
Ananga was next  in line and he ruled well,  protecting his  subjects  and meting out
justice. He was followed by his son Atibala who learnt the art of governance but did not
have control over his senses. The next ruler was Vena, who was dominated by passion
and hate, and was unlawful in his behaviour towards his subjects. The sages decided to
get rid of this evil king and stabbed him to death with blades of sacred kusha grass.
They churned his right thigh, and out of it emerged an ugly man named Nishada (a
forest tribal), who was told to go away because he was not fit to be king. Then they
churned Vena’s right hand and therefrom emerged Prithu, a man with a refined mind
and an acute understanding of the Vedas, the auxiliary texts, dharma, artha, the military
arts and politics. Prithu was consecrated king by the gods and sages and he proved to
be a good, exemplary king.
6 The second account of the origin of kingship in the Shanti Parva describes kingship as
the result of both divine intervention and a social contract.3 Oppressed by anarchy,
violence and insecurity, people came together and made agreements among themselves
to get rid of the violent,  aggressive men who stole,  violated women and performed
other such evil acts. However, this arrangement did not work. So they went to the god
Brahma and begged him to appoint a king who could protect them and whom they
would honour in return. Brahma chose Manu, but Manu refused. He was afraid of cruel
acts,  because  kingship  was  a  very  difficult  task,  especially  among  men,  who  are
perpetually prone to improper behaviour. The people urged Manu not to be afraid and
reassured  him  that  the  sin  incurred  by  his  cruel  deeds  would  go  away.  They  also
promised to give him 1/50th of their cattle and gold, and 1/10th of their grain; soldiers
skilled in war would follow him everywhere; and one-fourth of the merit earned by the
people  would  go  to  him.  Manu  accepted  this  pact  and  went  around  the  earth,
suppressing the wicked and making them perform their duties.
7 Let us now turn to a Buddhist account of the origins of kingship –the Aggañña Sutta of
the Digha Nikaya, a Pali text which is part of the Tipitaka.4 This begins in a primordial
age of perfection when beings were undifferentiated, luminous, made of mind, feeding
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on rapture. At some point of time, a process of decline set in, primarily due to greed.
Theft, accusation, lying and punishment appeared, and the last straw was when one
violated the private property of  another by stealing rice from his  field.  The beings
assembled and lamented this situation; they approached the one among them who was
the best-looking, charismatic and authoritative and asked him to protect property and
punish those who deserved punishment; in return they would give him a portion of
their rice.5 This ruler was given the designation “Mahasammata,” which means “the
Great Elect” or “one who has been elected or appointed by the people.”
8 In all three accounts I have discussed, kingship originates in violence and disorder. It
emerges  as  a  critical  institution,  the  only  option,  essential  to  bring  violence  and
disorder  to  an  end.  All  three  emphasise  the  king’s  duties  towards  his  people,  the
maintenance  of  social  order,  protection  of  private  property,  and  preventing  and
dealing with crime through the imposition of punishment. It is not just the origins of
kingship, but the continued existence of this institution, that is considered essential to
maintain  order  and  prevent  anarchy.  But  there  are  some  interesting  differences
between the accounts. The Buddhist text talks about a straight social contract between
the people and the king. In the first Shanti Parva account, the gods and sages play key
roles  and  in  the  second account,  it  is  the  gods  and  the  people.  In  contrast  to  the
Aggañña  Sutta,  the  beginnings  of  kingship  in  the  Mahabharata are  less  smooth;  the
institution has a bad start and there are various problems before it  receives a firm
foundation. There is an acknowledgement of the possibility that kings may have serious
flaws, that there is something inherently problematic or negative about the institution
of kingship; that those who inherit it may turn their back on it and may not want to
rule.  In  the  first  Shanti  Parva account,  kingship  is  born  in  the  midst  of  regicide,
renunciation and evil; in the second, it requires the king overcoming his own fears of
the cruelty and sin that are inherent in the discharge of his duties.
 
II. The king’s right to torture, punish and kill
9 Theories of the origins of kingship describe punishment as a primary duty of the king
but also assume that this punishment must be just. In the Mahabharata, Bhishma tells
Yudhishthira that the royal rod of force was created by Brahma for the protection of
the world so that people performed their duties; everything depends on it. Describing
dan ̣ḍa as a terrifying monster with many arms, legs, tusks and eyes, Bhishma states that
it inspires fear in people and it is this fear that prevents them from killing one other.
10 The nature of transgressions in which the king is obliged to intervene are of two types:
a more general transgression of the prevailing status quo; more specific crimes of a
civil or criminal nature. The most direct and poignant example from ancient texts of a
ruler killing a subject in the first kind of transgression comes from the Uttarakanda of
the Sanskrit epic the Ramayana (c. 400 BCE-400 CE), where the otherwise compassionate
Rama kills the Shudra Shambuka6. The epic gives a moral justification for Rama’s action:
an  innocent  Brahmana  child  in  Rama’s  kingdom  had  died  and  the  reason  for  this
unfortunate event was traced to Shambuka who had violated the norms of the social
order by performing austerities. Such a violation could not be tolerated, and Rama had
no hesitation in killing Shambuka for the sake of the greater good.
11 The text that discusses the role of the state in intervening in specific types of civil and
criminal  offences  and  the  state’s  right  to  impose  retribution,  pain  and  torture  on
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subjects in the administration of justice is Kautilya’s Arthashastra (composed between c.
50-300 CE), which contains the first detailed prescriptive law code in India. Here too,
the  idea  of  the  four-fold  varṇa order  is  extremely  important  –punishments  vary,
depending on the varn ̣a status of the individuals involved. The types of punishment
mentioned  by  Kautilya  include  fines,  confiscation  of  property,  exile,  corporeal
punishment, mutilation, branding, torture, forced labour and death. Kautilya accepts
torture as a means of acquiring information during interrogation as well as a part of
punishment,  and the types of torture include those that involve striking, whipping,
caning, suspension from a rope and inserting needles under the nails.
12 The Arthashastra also asserts the state’s right to take life on the grounds of justice. It
distinguishes  between  simple  death  and  death  by  torture.7 The  latter  refers  to
especially painful deaths, which may also have involved public spectacle. The varieties
of death by torture are the following: burning on a pyre, drowning in water, cooking in
a big jar, impaling on a stake, setting fire to different parts of the body, and tearing
apart by bullocks.
13 However,  all  texts  emphasise  that  the  king’s  punishment  must  be  measured,  in
accordance  with  proper  judicial  principles,  proportionate  to  the  crime  and  utterly
impartial. Bhishma tells Yudhishthira that like the spring sun, the king should be both
gentle  (mṛidu)  and harsh (tikshna),  especially  in  matters  related to  punishment and
taxation.8 The Mahabharata connects the king’s proper administration of justice with
his afterlife –a just king goes to heaven; an unjust one goes to hell.
 
III. Resistance and rebellion against the state
14 The Mahabharata is a text that ultimately upholds the institution of kingship and the
use of necessary force. At the same time, it warns that excessive cruelty and violence of
the king and his neglect of his duties can lead to justified violence against him. We have
already seen that regicide is built into one of the Mahabharata accounts of the early
history of the institution of kingship –remember the evil king Vena who was stabbed to
death with kusha grass by the sages. Further, the epic tells us that a cruel king, who
does  not  protect  his  people,  who  robs  them  in  the  name  of  levying  taxes,  is  evil
incarnate and should be killed by his subjects. A king who, after promising to protect
his subjects does not do so, should be killed by them, as though he were a mad dog.9 So
if  the king does not perform his duties and is  cruel  to his people,  the Mahabharata
sanctions regicide.
15 There  are  several  references  in  ancient  Indian  texts  to  evil  kings  –most  of  them
mythical or of uncertain historicity– who were justifiably killed.10 The reasons for their
being killed include their moral failings such as greed, injustice, lust and evil deeds.11
Should such stories be read as a warning to kings against transgressions, or were they
endorsements of rebellion? Notwithstanding the references to the killing of kings, the
overall political discourse of the Mahabharata upholds the king’s position and punitive
powers.  However,  there  are  several  other  indications  that  the  upper  class  male
composers of our texts recognised the possibility of critique, resistance or rebellion
against the state. The fears and anxieties of the upper classes are writ large in the idea
of  Kali  age,  a  world  turned horribly  upside  down,  where  people  violate  their  class
duties and farmers do not pay taxes.
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16 The Arthashastra is unsentimental and sanctions all the killing, mutilation, torture and
capital punishment necessary for the administration of justice and for the protection,
maintenance and enhancement  of  the  king’s  power.  It  is  also  acutely  aware of  the
potential sources of violence against the king. The text is obsessed with the danger of
assassination, especially through poison, and advises elaborate arrangements for the
king’s personal  protection.  Queens and princes  head the list  of  sources  of  violence
against the king. Queens are singled out for special attention, and Kautilya lists several
specific instances of kings who were killed by their consorts. Kautilya identifies many
other  potential  sources  of  violence  against  the  king  –for  instance,  enemy  kings;
neighbouring  kings;  disaffected,  angry  subjects;  forest tribes;  robbers;  mlechchhas
(foreigners and tribals);  and mutinous troops.  He talks about the dangers posed by
conspiracies, traitors and enemies. He discusses revolts in the interior and exterior,
and describes the former as more dangerous. He discusses how internal and external
enemies can be killed, many of the strategies involving secret agents in disguise. He
also advocates secret killing –silent punishment in the case of those who cannot be
killed openly– for instance, treasonous high-ranking officers. Silent punishment can
also be used against hostile subjects.12
17 The Arthashastra prescribes violent punishments for violent crimes against the king.
The punishment for one who reviles the king, reveals secret counsel, or who spreads
evil news about the king is that his tongue should be rooted out.13 More serious crimes
against the king invite more severe punishments. Death by setting fire to the hands and
head is the punishment for one who covets the kingdom, who attacks the king’s palace,
who incites forest people or enemies or who causes rebellion in the fortified city, the
countryside, or the army.14 In many instances, punishments can be commuted to a fine.
But unless there is some crucial mitigating circumstance, no commutation is possible
where the crime merits the death penalty, especially in cases of treason or loss to the
state. Although varṇa is central to Kautilya’s understanding of society and law, capital
crimes against king or state, for instance treason, are often discussed without reference
to the varṇa of the parties involved, except for the occasional concessions being made
to Brahmanas, who stood at the apex of the varṇa hierarchy.
18 Kautilya’s emphasis on subjecting officials to stringent and frequent tests of loyalty
indicates an awareness that loyalty cannot be taken for granted. This can be connected
with the king’s constant fear of assassination; his need to use “silent punishment”; for
constant  surveillance  to  keep  track  of  non-compliance,  rebellion  and  treason;
references to those who are enraged and frightened; the fear of deceit and betrayal; the
worry  about  dangers  posed  by  mlechchhas  and  forest  people;  and  the  importance
attached to conciliation and outwitting. The references to the “anger of the people”
(prakṛiti-kopa)  are  especially  interesting.  In  ancient  Indian  texts,  there  are  few
references to kings being killed by their people and these occur mainly in the Buddhist
Jatakas.15 But the Arthashastra’s references to the anger of the people, indicates that
although there is no record of rampant mass rebellion of the people in ancient Indian
history, the political theorists were able to visualise such an event.
19 In fact, Kautilya understood the importance of hidden transcripts –trying to find out
what people were saying about the king behind his back. 16He recommends that spies in
disguise should fan out to all  parts of the kingdom, engage in provocative talk and
ferret out people who were saying negative things about the king, so that the king
could kill them, crushing disaffection before it became revolt.
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20 Although the Arthashastra is usually seen as a text upholding the idea of totalitarian
state, its discussion is premised on a recognition of the fragility of the king’s power and
the  constant  threats  to  his  life  and  position  from  many  quarters.  It  is  a  graphic
acknowledgement that the ruler was constantly the potential target of the violence of
others. Kautilya advocates the ruthless, carefully calculated and effective use of pre-
emptive and post-facto violence by the state in order to prevent and counter violence
against the state. Ethical issues are subordinated, in fact are irrelevant, in the face of
pragmatic political calculation. So a text which describes the dizzying heights of power
to which a ruler could aspire also presents him as an insecure, vulnerable figure who
lives in constant danger of being undermined or killed. In this respect, the discussions
of general issues in normative texts may actually give us better insights into political
realities and processes than the enumeration of “factual details”, which in any case
reach us after they have been censored and sanitised of violence and resistance, and
only  after  the  panegyrists  had  converted  the  tumult  and  violence  that  must  have
marked many a king’s reign into a smooth, aestheticised narrative that was in tune
with  the  discourse  of  normative  dharmic  kingship,  in  a  language  which  sought  to
normalise and justify the violence inherent in kingship.
21 When  the  cracks  in  the  normative  views  become  visible,  a  more  fractured  and
contested picture of ancient Indian politics emerges, one where the onward march of
the state and empire-building is accompanied by a recognition of their fragility.
 
IV. Theory and practice and a long-term comparative
history of violence
22 I would like to end my paper by raising a few general questions related to the study of
political violence. The first question is: what impact did the political ideas discussed in
normative texts, including theories about the origins, nature and functions of kingship
have on political practice? How effectively did these theories bolster political and social
hierarchies? What was their political and social impact in a context where multiple
theories existed, and where the issue of dharma itself was fraught with complexity and
confusion?
23 Royal inscriptions allude to the textual theories of kingship. The idea of the king as
protector  of  the  people  and  of  the social  order  consisting  of  the  varṇas  (the  four
hereditary  social  classes)  and  ashramas (the  four  stages  of  life) 17 is  frequently
mentioned in rulers’ epigraphic eulogies. There are also a few interesting references to
the  people  intervening  in  matters  related  to  succession.  Rather  than  taking  them
literally, these sorts of references can be seen as echoes of the contractual theories of
kingship that the texts elaborate.
24 There is no direct evidence that the latent sanction of regicide in the Mahabharata was
ever  invoked  to  sanction  rebellion  against  the  state.  In  fact,  recorded  instances  of
violent  rebellion  against  the  state  involving  players  beyond  the  circle  of  political
contenders or  subordinate rulers  are practically  non-existent  in ancient  India.  This
could be because of the effective concealment of such incidents by our statist/centrist
sources; the effectiveness of the state’s coercive machinery, the effectiveness of the
legitimising, hegemonic discourse; and/or the lack of a collective consciousness and
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organisation that would enable the individual victims of state violence or oppression to
make common cause and effectively raise the banner of revolt.
25 We should note that royal inscriptions deliberately try to conceal the violence that
must have marked dynastic succession, in fact, this masking was one of their functions.
While  inter-dynastic  violence  in  the  form of  war  was  advertised  and celebrated  in
ancient  Indian  inscriptions,  intra-dynastic  violence  was  masked  in  the  royal
genealogies that usually presented a smooth story of succession, occasionally referring
obliquely to more troubled circumstances.
26 The second general issue concerns the factors that define violence and the normalising
processes that make some kinds of harming or killing by the state or against the state
seem  justified.  These  are  deeply  embedded  in  social  and  political  structures,
institutions and ideologies, as well as in moral and religious values. Debates on violence
in  ideologies  or  movements  associated  with  nonviolence  deserve  especially  close
attention. My investigation of early Buddhist and Jaina texts indicates that the religions
of non-violence recognised the necessity of the use of a certain amount of force in the
political domain. But the existence, embeddedness and strength of these renunciatory
traditions did provide an important philosophical and ethical resource that political
practitioners had to acknowledge and could not completely ignore; they made violence
and nonviolence issues that had to addressed, even if there was a general consensus
that absolute nonviolence was impossible in the political sphere.
27 The third issue arises due to our heightened sensitivity towards political violence in
our own times:  this  lends a  great  urgency to  investigations of  violence,  but  it  also
presents us with a problem: should the past be examined on its own terms or should it
be used as a resource to deal with our troubled and violent times? This is an old sort of
question, but an exploration of violence in history undertaken in our violent world
urges us to engage with it yet again.
28 Finally, without essentialising cultures and without falling into the traps of cultural
bias or chauvinism, there is the interesting possibility of having a comparative history
of the ideas and practice of violence and nonviolence, one which identifies qualitative
differences in forms, structures, intensity, ideologies and attitudes related to political
violence across cultures and across time.
NOTES
1. Of course, when it is justified, it is justified force, and not unjustified violence.
2. Mahabharata. 12.59.1-140 (Fitzgerald, pp. 305-312).
3. Mahabharata. 12.67.17-31.
4. See Steven Collins Aggañña Sutta: The Discourse on What is Primary (An Annotated Translation from
Pali), Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2001.
5. Ibid., 46.
6. Ancient Brahmanical texts have the idea of a hierarchy of four hereditary social  classes –
Brahmanas,  Kshatriyas,  Vaishyas and  Shudras.  Brahmanas were  associated  with  studying  and
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teaching the Veda and performing sacrifices; Kshatriyas with war and governance; Vaishyas with
farming, rearing animals and trade; and Shudras with serving the upper three varn ̣as.
7. Arthashastra 4. 11.
8. See especially Mahabharata. 12.70; 12.121.
9. Mahabharata. 13.60.19-20.
10. There are other references to the killing of kings in ancient Indian texts. See Walter Ruben,
“Fighting  against  despots  in  old  Indian  literature,”  Annals  of  the  Bhandarkar  Oriental  Research
Institute, vol. 48/48, Golden Jubilee Volume, 1917-1961 (1968): 111-118.




15. Cited by Ruben, “Fighting against despots in old Indian literature.”
16. On public  and hidden transcripts,  see  Scott’s  Domination  and the  Arts  of  Resistance:  Hidden
Transcripts (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1990), especially pp. 2, 4, 183, 191.
17. The classical model of the four ashramas, which was supposed to be applicable to the upper
three varn ̣as, comprised the stage of celibate studenthood (brahmacharya), the householder stage
(grihastha), partial renunciation (vanaprastha) and complete renunciation (sannyasa). Like varṇa,
the ashrama scheme should be understood as part of the normative Brahmanical view of society,
not as a description of actual practice.
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